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Both scientists and practitioners agree that
definition is a necessary precursor to productive
discourse. But any definition must be clearly understood
by both parties. For example, the hip musician's
definition of jazz --Jazz is when you dig it, man!--does
not help the naive listener who sincerely wants to
appreciate jazz music but lacks the artistic
sophistication of the professional musician. While this
definition of jazz is too simple, the musician can also
confuse a listener by excessive use of jargon that is too
sophisticated. Few listeners could sympathize with a jazz
trumpet player who complained about being boxed in by a C
minor ninth vamp laid down by his pianist.
Similar dangers abound when research scientists try
to define and explain mental workload to airplane pilots
and other interested non-researchers. As a researcher I am
well aware that the jargon used by human factors
specialists may not always make sense to the uninitiated.
Yet I also understand that an overly simple definition of
mental workload --Too much mental workload is when you
can't fly the plane right --also is not helpful. My
goal in this article is to try to explain to the pilot why
and how workload researchers approach what may appear to
the pilot as a simple problem in very complex ways. There
just is no easy way to define and measure mental workload.
Why Use Theory?
Researchers and practitioners can be arranged along a
hypothetical continuum according to how they approach
solving a problem. At the cost of only minor exaggeration
we might characterize practitioners as being so anxious to
solve a problem that they often solve the wrong problem
whereas researchers are so anxious to get everything right
that they seldom solve any problems! In order to reach a
satisfactory solution, albeit not necessarily an optimal
one, we must operate nearer to the middle of this
continuum instead of at an extreme endpoint. It is true
that an experienced problem-solver can often come up with
a satisfactory answer without explicitly invoking theory.
But I would argue that this approach is too idiosyncratic
to work in general. The world does not have enough
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experienced problem solvers to meet every need. However,
one theory goes a long way. It can be applied to many
different practical scenarios. Theories offer generality.
We do not need a separate theory for each problem. We may
not even need a very complex theory to get a direction for
solving a practical problem like evaluating pilot mental
workload. After all, you don't need a Ferrari to go
grocery shopping. A Volkswaqen will get you to the store
and back. When I am asked to solve a problem like
measuring pilot mental workload, I start out by looking for
a handy theory. I do not expect the theory to solve my
problem, only to get me started in a promising direction.
Theory can be a filter that narrows down a large set of
possible approaches allowing us to concentrate our efforts
upon a few techniques that are most likely to yield
satisfactory solutions.
There is a deplorable tendency for the practitioner
to avoid theory because it does not seem relevant to the
immediate problem at hand. Each problem is seen as an
isolated issue and, practitioners who avoid theory run the
considerable risk of reinventing the wheel time and time
again without realizing it. But even the practitioner who
wants to use theory must face at least two major
obstacles. Most psychological theories have been
formulated in arcane ways with little regard for fostering
practical applications. Furthermore, there are too many
theories so that it is hard for the practitioner to select
one theory from the abundance created by diligent
researchers. Later on I will suggest one particular kind
of theory that should be useful for studying pilot mental
workload. For now, I acknowledge these obstructions.
I believe that theory offers four substantial
benefits to the practitioner faced with a real-world
problem. First, it fills in where data are lacking. We
will never have enough empirical results to solve all
problems. Theory is needed for accurate and sensible
interpolation. Second, theory can yield the precise
predictions that engineers and designers demand. It is
better to have predictions about the workload imposed on a
pilot by some particular system design than to have to
build the system and then obtain data to fix the next
version. Third, theory prevents us from reinventing the
wheel. It allows us to recognize similarities among
problems. Fourth, theory is the best practical tool. Once
an appropriate theory is available, it can be used cheaply
and efficiently to aid system design.
I_0
Limited Capacity Theory of Attention
My approach to the practical problem of pilot mental
workload is derived from basic research on attention. A
detailed analysis of the kind of theory best suited for
this work can be found in Kantowitz (ref.1). Here I will
only summarize my conclusions in this regard. I prefer an
attention theory with a single limited pool of capacity as
the starting point for studies of pilot mental workload.
Such a model was popularized by Broadbent (ref.2). While
current views of attention realize that many of the
details of this original limited-channel model are
incorrect (see ref. 3 for a review), the fundamental idea
of a single limited-capacity source that funds mental
operations remains sound. This concept of attention is
particularly useful for work on pilot mental workload
because it carries with it the idea of spare capacity.
Spare capacity is roughly defined as extra capacity not
currently being used by the human but available
immediately should the need arise.
There are certain assumptions used by most basic
researchers studying attention and capacity that deserve
explicit mention (ref. 3). First, we assume that behavior
can be understood in terms of a hypothetical flow of
information inside the organism. This flow cannot be
directly observed but must instead be inferred from overt
measures of performance. Models must not only duplicate
the overt performance but must also make reasonable
statements about this postulated internal information
flow. For example, a female singer and a tape recording
made with the proper brand of tape can both shatter a
slender crystal goblet. Nevertheless, no one would claim
that the human vocal tract and an electronic tape recorder
produce sound by the same internal information flow.
Second, we assume that capacity is the "price" each
internal processing stage charges the system to perform
its own activity or information transformation. If
sufficient capacity is not available, the internal
processing stage may be unable to perform its function
properly and/or may require greater processing time.
Third, we assume that allocation rules determine how
capacity is mapped to internal stages. This is especially
important when demand exceeds supply. A complete model of
attention and information processing should have something
explicit to say about each of these three key assumptions
(ref. 3).
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Defining Mental Workload
Mental workload is an intervening variable, similar
to attention, that modulates or indexes the tuning between
the demands of the environment and the capacity of the
organism. Before considering the implications of this
definition I must first explain what I mean by
"intervening variable."
Intervening variables have been the subject of much
discussion in psychology, especially as contrasted with
hypothetical constructs (ref. 4). A hypothetical construct
has surplus meaning; for example, one might try to locate
the physiological basis of the hypothetical construct
called the limited-capacity channel. An intervening
variable is closely coupled to the operations that define
it. Indeed, it ceases to exist without these operations.
For example, learning is often defined as a relatively
permanent change in behavior between the first test of
some knowledge and a later test. Presumably better
performance on the later test is evidence for the
intervening variable we call learning. If the tests are
removed, we can no longer make any statements about
learning. Learning is thus inferred from a change in
performance. It cannot be observed directly.
In a similar manner, both attention and mental
workload are also intervening variables. They cannot be
observed directly. We make inferences about attention or
workload only on the basis of observed changes in
performance. If performance decreases we often attribute
this decrease to increased mental workload (or decreased
attention).
There are at least four important implications of the
definition of mental workload stated above. First, it
implies that both underload and overload are cause for
concern. In both cases there is an imbalance between the
demands of the environment and the capabilities of the
organism. A crew falling asleep on a trans-oceanic flight
is as much a pilot mental workload problem as an engine
fire. Second, the definition implies that capacity is
fixed. Third, to be most useful the definition implies
that spare capacity is related to mental workload and this
in turn implies that a single-pool model of capacity will
work better than attention models that postulate multiple
sources of capacity. Fourth, it implies that the limit
upon the internal information flow within the human is one
of rate not amount. An analogy (ref. 5) will make this
clear. No highway engineer is truly interested in the
number of cars that a freeway can hold as a static
182
measure. While this number is important for designing
parking lots, highway engineers are far more concerned
with the number of cars that can flow past a given point
in some specified time. Similarly, the amount of
information per unit time, bits/sec, that can flow through
the human is more important for understanding pilot mental
workload than an absolute amount of information with no
time constraint.
Measuring Mental Workload
There are three general methods for measuring pilot
mental workload: (I) subjective measures, (2) objective
measures, especially those based upon secondary tasks, and
(3) psychophysiological measures. These are discussed in
general by Kantowitz (ref. I) and as they relate to
aviation by Kantowitz and Casper (ref. 6). All methods
have advantages and disadvantages. There is no clearly
superior method to measure pilot mental workload in all
circumstances. I believe that secondary-task measures
offer the best opportunity to obtain valid and reliable
indices of pilot mental workload now. In the near future
psychophysiological measures may also prove to be quite
useful.
The reader may be surprised that I have not endorsed
subjective measures, since these are by far the most
widely used method at present. While it is awfully easy to
obtain subjective measures, they are quite difficult to
interpret. There are at least two fundamental problems
with them. First, with the possible exception of SWAT*
ratings (ref. 7), the psychometric properties of most
subjective rating scales have not been established. While
at least interval scale properties are required for
meaningful measurement and comparison, it is not at all
clear that more than ordinal measurement has been achieved
in most cases. Second, people are not very good at giving
direct introspections that accurately reflect their own
internal mental states. Psychology has long abandoned the
method of introspection because it utterly failed to
produce reliable data. A more recent example can be found
in the work of Metcalfe (ref. 8) who studied people's
ability to solve anagram puzzles and other brain teasers.
Every ten seconds subjects were asked to rate on a scale
of 0 to 10 how close they felt they were to a correct
solution. The results were extremely lucid. People were
grossly inaccurate in their ratings. When they gave high
ratings, indicating that they thought they were close to a
correct solution, they were more likely to give an
incorrect answer than to reveal the proper solution. This
demonstrates once again that subjective intuitions may not
*Subjective workload assessment technique (SWAT)
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be reliable.
Thus, we are better off relying upon objective data
provided by secondary tasks and psychophysiology. The
secondary-task paradigm attempts to obtain direct
estimates of spare capacity, and hence mental workload, by
requiring an additional task to be performed at the same
time as the primary flying task. Decrements in secondary-
task performance are interpreted as reflecting mental
workload imposed by the primary task. Primary tasks that
demand greater mental workload will cause poorer
performance on the concurrent secondary task.
In order for this interpretation to be valid, several
control conditions must be included in the experimental
evaluation of mental workload; see Kantowitz (ref. 3) for
a detailed explanation and examples of published research
where these safeguards have been neglected. The crucial
assumption of the secondary-task method is that insertion
of the secondary task does not alter primary-task
performance or the internal information flow within the
human operator.
In the past, secondary tasks were chosen largely on the
basis of convenience with little thought given to the
theoretical or methodological implications of secondary-
task selection. Now, however, it is generally realized
that there is no panacea that will create a universal
secondary task. Many issues must be considered carefully
before a satisfactory secondary task can be accomplished.
Some relevant questions are:
I Will this research be carried out in [I] an operational
setting [2] a flight simulator [3] a laboratory?
2 The primary task is [I] flying C2] tracking [3] other
continuous task [4] other discrete task.
3 Most primary-task information is presented [I] visually
[2] auditorally [3] tactually.
4 The primary-task input information load (e.g., rate of
information per unit time such as bits/sec) is [I] low [2]
medium [3] high.
5 Input information load is [I] constant [2] low
variability [3] high variability.
6 Output modality is mostly [I] manual [2] verbal.
7. Output responses occur [I] seldom [2] moderately often
[3] frequently.
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8. Operators are [I] unpracticed [2] moderately practiced
[3] highly practiced professionals.
9. Operator motivation is [I] low [2] moderate [3] high.
10. Procedures associated with the primary task are [I]
well-specified and usually performed in a consistent
manner [2] leave the operator some discretion for
arranging his work [3] vague and subject to considerable
interpretation.
These considerations are sufficiently complex so that an
expert system is now under construction to help choose
appropriate secondary tasks. Workload COnsultant for
Secondary Task Selection (W. COSTS) presents lists of
questions similar to those above and makes recommendations
for selecting suitable secondary tasks. This expert system
uses rule-based chaining to derive its suggested secondary
tasks (ref. 9).
Simulator Example of Secondary-Task Research
At the risk of appearing immodest I will illustrate
secondary-task techniques with a series of studies my col-
leagues and I have conducted in a motion-base (GAT) flight
simulator at Ames Research Center (refs. 10,11,12 and 13).
The primary task in all these studies was flying the
simulator. The secondary task was choice-reaction time
with two, three, or four alternatives. This contrasts with
the typical study where a simple (one-choice) secondary
reaction task has been used. However, based upon a hybrid
model of attention (ref. 14) I believed that simple probe
tasks were too insensitive and subject to a host of
methodological problems. While many researchers felt it
would be safer to use a simple probe task because this
simple task would be less likely to interfere with the
primary flying task, I disagreed. I believed that
professional pilots would not allow the secondary task to
interfere with flying. The first responsibility of a pilot
is to keep the airplane safely in flight. Therefore,
professional pilots seemed to me to be the ideal
population for taking the risks associated with a complex
choice-reaction secondary task.
Results have been excellent. Flying performance
measured by root mean square error was not adversely
affected by adding the complex secondary task.
Furthermore, this secondary task was able to discriminate
among levels of workload in many different simulated
flight situations. I conclude that the choice-reaction
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task should be high on everyone's list of preferred
secondary tasks. Indeed, this opinion of mine is reflected
in W. COSTS which tends to suggest choice reactions for
almost any situation where pilot mental workload must be
measured.
Psychophysioloqical Measures
Objective measures need not be only behavioral. The
technology for recording psychophysiological correlates of
behavior is now well advanced and many of these biological
indicants have been used to estimate pilot mental workload
(ref. 15). Once monitoring electrodes have been attached
to the pilot, these indices have the advantage of being
relatively unobtrusive. They do not interfere with flying
as might be the case for behavioral secondary tasks.
However, these data are often difficult to interpret even
though they are easier to understand than most subjective
ratings. Theories of psychophysiology are not yet as
advanced as theories of attention and do not provide a
complete framework for interpreting data.
In my laboratory we have had modest success in using
heart rate (sinus arrhythmia) and evoked potential as
indicants of attention in a psychological refractory
period task (ref. 16) and a divided attention task
described later in this volume (ref. 17). Oth_ers have
successfully used psychophysiological tasks to measure
pilot mental workload (see ref. 6 for a review). I believe
that as theoretical models of psychophysiological
indicants are refined, these techniques will become an
important part of the toolbox used by human factors
specialists to measure pilot mental workload.
Conclusions
The best practical tool is a good theory. Models of
attention based upon a single pool of limited capacity
offer an excellent starting point for measuring pilot
mental workload. Thus, I define mental workload as an
intervening variable similar to attention.
Objective measures are preferable for measuring pilot
mental workload. Secondary tasks, especially choice-
reaction time, are extremely useful in this regard.
Psychophysiological tasks will be more useful in the near
future as theoretical models are refined.
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